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ABSTRACT
This paper is primarily aimed at highlighting the role and significance of asymmetric 
information in contributing to financial contagion. Furthermore, in emphasising the 
importance of greater disclosure requirements and the need for the disclosure of information 
relating to “close links”, such disclosure being considered vital in assisting the regulator in 
identifying potential sources of material risks, it illustrates the fact that incentives (such as the 
reduction in the levels of capital to be retained by institutions), which have the potential to 
facilitate market based regulation (through non binding regulations), may not necessarily 
serve as suitable means in the realisation of some of Basel II’s objectives – namely the 
achievement of “prudentially sound, incentive-compatible and risk sensitive capital 
requirements”. 
The paper also attempts to raise the awareness that the operation of  risk mitigants does not 
justify a reduction in the capital levels to be retained by banks – since banks operating with 
risk mitigants could still be considered inefficient operators of their management information 
systems (MIS), internal control systems, and risk management processes. The fact that banks 
possess risk mitigants does not necessarily imply that they are complying with Basel Core 
Principles for effective supervision (particularly Core Principles 7 and 17) – as the paper will 
seek to demonstrate. Core Principle 7 not only stipulates that “banks and banking groups 
satisfy supervisory requirements of a comprehensive management process, ensure that this 
identifies, evaluates, monitors and controls or mitigates all material risks and assesses their 
overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile, but that such processes correspond to 
the size and complexity of the institution.” Certain incentives which assume the form of 
capital reductions are considered by the Basel Committee to “impose minimum operational 
standards in recognition that poor management of operational risks (including legal risks) 
could render such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that although partial 
mitigation is rewarded, banks will be required to hold capital against residual risks”.
Information disclosure should be encouraged for several reasons, amongst which include the 
fact that imperfect information is considered to be a cause of market failure – which “reduces 
the maximisation potential of regulatory competition”, and also because disclosure 
requirements would contribute to the reduction of risks which could be generated when 
granting reduced capital level rewards to banks who may have poor management systems.
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1. Introduction
One of the objectives which the Basel II framework was intended to achieve is the “alignment 
of capital adequacy assessment more closely with the key elements of banking risks and to 
provide incentives for banks to enhance their risk management and management 
capabilities.”2 The Basel Committee is of the opinion that “improved risk sensitivity in 
minimum capital requirements” with respect to greater recognition of credit risk mitigation 
techniques, has the potential to provide positive incentives to banks to improve risk 
measurement and management of risk mitigants.3
The role played by bank capital within the context of bank soundness and risk taking 
incentives and corporate governance are factors which are considered to contribute to its 
importance.4 However, as revealed during the recent crisis, capital adequacy requirements on 
their own, cannot sufficiently address the problems generated as a result of the occurrence of 
systemic, liquidity risks and maturity mismatches. For this reason, an investigation into the 
possible impact of disclosure requirements on risk taking incentives and the effectiveness of 
such disclosure requirements would have important implications for the banking industry in 
particular. The impact of capital and disclosure requirements on risk taking incentives and 
risks will be approached from two dimensions:
1) Impact on management incentives
2) Impact on asymmetric information – given the fact that asymmetric information has 
the potential to trigger bank runs and systemic risks.
Hence section 2 will consider the impact of capital and disclosure requirements on 
management incentives. The impact of capital and disclosure requirements on asymmetric 
information will thereafter be considered in the first subsection to section 3 whilst the other 
subsection will comprise of a discussion on pro cyclicality – embracing a consideration of 
systemic related aspects and liquidity risks. The justification for regulation within the bank 
sector and the securities markets will be introduced under section 4. Under this section,  three 
principal and traditional arguments which are considered insufficient in justifying capital 
regulation within the bank sector will be analysed. A further argument which relates to the 
potential of information asymmetry between bank managers and depositors to generate 
market failures, and which consequently provides the rationale for government or central bank 
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intervention in the financial system, is one which is considered to be more convincing - even  
though such an argument also does not evade criticism entirely.
Sections 5 and 6 will deal respectively with disclosure requirements and the impact of 
remuneration policies on risk taking incentives. Section 7 will then introduce the concept, 
benefits and disadvantages of regulatory competition from a perspective which incorporates 
binding and non binding legislations. As well as elaborating on the advantages and 
disadvantages that are associated with binding and mandatory regulations, this section inter 
alia will attempt to draw a parallel between regulatory competition and Basel II. Focus will be 
dedicated to the effects of  capital requirements – irrespective of whether they are binding or 
non binding in nature.
Efforts being undertaken to facilitate the imposition of binding obligations on credit 
institutions and investment firms, and reasons attributed to the importance of binding 
recommendations, will be considered before a conclusion is arrived at.
2. Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Management Incentives
By impacting management incentives (through disclosure requirements), the effectiveness of 
capital adequacy requirements will be enhanced. It has been argued that amendments to Basel 
II will have little impact unless management incentives can be projected in the right direction.
According to Perotti and Suarez who put forward a proposal5, “liquidity assistance to help 
banks cope with aggregate liquidity shocks is a good thing in principle, but has little value if 
banks are not given the right incentives to reduce the probability of such shocks in the first 
place”.6
Such a proposal is aimed at providing banks with “the right incentives ex ante and at 
improving the resilience of the financial system to shocks ex post”.7 A mandatory liquidity 
insurance arrangement under which individual banks are obliged to pay a liquidity charge to 
the supervisory authority, will serve to supplement Basel II rules is also proposed.8
Certain schemes, whilst implemented with the aim of mitigating systemic and institutional 
risks, have also been known to contribute towards higher risk taking levels and the 
aggravation of risk levels. Two of such schemes will be considered in this paper. The first, 
namely, deposit insurance schemes will be considered in the following section whilst liquidity 
insurance arrangements will be considered under section seven of this paper.
Deposit Insurance Schemes 
Deposit insurance schemes, whilst serving as a means of avoiding bank runs, have also 
contributed to higher risk taking levels by banks. It is argued that “deposit insurance (when 
not fairly priced), provides banks with an incentive to increase risk taking” – and that such 
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risk taking is facilitated by banks, through an augmentation of the risk of banks’ assets or 
their leverage.9 Such risk taking incentive, it is further argued, along with the “potential 
externalities resulting from bank failures”, serves as one of the primary justifications for the 
regulation of bank capital.10 Within such a context, greater disclosure requirements within the 
banking sector would generate immense benefits since it is contended that “ the presence of 
information asymmetry might make the computation of reasonable premiums impossible or 
undesirable” – such reasonably priced premiums constituting a vital step towards the 
“elimination of risk shifting incentives.”11 Although the elimination of risk shifting incentives 
is a debatable aim12, reasonably priced premiums would certainly contribute towards the 
mitigation of risk shifting incentives.
3. Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Asymmetric Information.
A. The Link between Systemic Risks and Asymmetric Information
The rationale for regulation constitutes the embodiment of two issues:
- Systemic risk
- Asymmetric information
Systemic risks are considered to be of greater relevance to the banking industry. This will be 
demonstrated through the relationship between systemic, liquidity risks and maturity 
mismatches, and the role assumed by central banks and banks in liquidity and maturity 
transformation processes. Since  systemic risks are considered to be of greater relevance to the 
banking industry and since information asymmetry appears to be of greater relevance to the 
securities markets, it could be argued that the impact of capital regulation requirements on 
risk taking would be greater within the banking sector whilst disclosure requirements would 
impact risk taking to a greater extent in the securities markets (than within the banking 
sector). The expected impact of disclosure requirements and capital regulatory requirements 
on risk taking would be to mitigate incentives to take unduly high levels of risks, and not to 
eliminate risks completely.
However, there is growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending capital rules 
to the securities markets. This not only arises from increased conglomeration and 
globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, but also the fact that 
„the globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and capital seeking 
companies to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.“13 Furthermore, 
it is not only argued that „the fact that many banks in a number of countries have chosen to 
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securitise assets is probably largely due to the capital requirements imposed on them“, but 
also that present rules do not „explicitly cover risks other than credit and market risk“.14
Systemic risks and the central role assumed by banks in relation to liquidity serves as greater 
justification for regulation with respect to banks. “The fundamental role of banks in the 
maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently 
vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as 
a whole.“15
In relation to the securities markets, information asymmetry appears to constitute a greater 
basis for regulation.16 However, the existence of information asymmetry within the banking 
sector has the potential to generate systemic effects within the banking sector – consequences 
whose effects, it could be said, could have greater repercussions than if such were to originate 
from within the securities markets.
As illustrated in the previous section, systemic risks and asymmetric information are two 
concepts which do not operate in isolation. The importance and magnitude attached to the 
consequences of information asymmetry within the banking sector does not depend so much 
on information asymmetry on its own, but its link with systemic risks, the relationship 
between systemic, liquidity risks and maturity mismatches, and the role assumed by central 
banks and banks in liquidity and maturity transformation processes. The domino effect 
resulting from a combination of these contributes to its importance within the banking sector.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability 
Review, is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge17 which banks have about their 
borrowers and the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”18 The importance of the link 
between liquidity risks and systemic risks within the banking sector is highlighted by the 
consequences attributed to the reluctance of banks to retain liquidity - given the cost of 
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holding liquidity.19 The consequential shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance 
sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the importance of the role assumed by central banks in 
the funding of bank balance sheets.20
B. Procyclicality – Systemic Aspects and Liquidity Risks
The three aspects to pro cyclicality21 – as highlighted in the Impact Assessment Document 
amending the Capital Requirements Directive, have the potential to trigger a chain reaction. 
Starting with remuneration schemes, the impact of these on management incentives, could 
have a positive or negative effect on bank regulations (such as Basel II or the CRD). Such 
regulations could then mitigate or exacerbate pro cyclical effects – depending on the 
effectiveness of capital adequacy rules. A positive effect of such rules would reduce the 
tendency of banks to cut back on lending during economic “busts” whilst incentives to retain 
liquidity would be increased – hence reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of maturity 
mismatches.
Liquidity is considered to be “highly procyclical, growing in good times and drying up in 
times of stress.”22 During the build up to the present crisis, banks and other financial 
institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity.23 Given the fact that 
liquidity could also be pro cyclical and given its role in the recent crisis, perhaps four 
dimensions to pro cyclicality should have been introduced in the Impact Assessment 
Document24 amending the Capital Requirements Directive – incorporating liquidity as a 
fourth heading. 
According to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an earlier recognition of loan losses, which 
could have been facilitated by relevant disclosures about loan loss provisioning, could have 
reduced pro cyclical effects which occurred during the recent crisis.25 Not only does the FSF 
propose that amendments be made to the Basel II framework - amendments which are aimed 
at reducing banks’ disincentives to increase their level of provisions for loan losses, it is also 
of the opinion that measures aimed at improving market discipline could also help in reducing 
procyclicality and diversity.26 Furthermore, incentives which would encourage banks to retain 
liquidity could be introduced – however , such incentives should be granted whilst striving to 
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comply with the aims and objectives of Basel – particularly those aimed at enhancing a 
regulatory framework which is more aligned  with economic and regulatory capital.
As well as drawing attention to the fact that capital buffers may not actually mitigate the 
cyclical effects of bank regulation,27 regulators are also advised to give due consideration to 
the effects of risk weights on bank portfolio behaviour when implementing regulations.
4. Justification for Regulation within the Banking Sector and Securities Markets.
The “conventional justification” for regulation within the securities market is attributed to the 
fact that “exchanges on securities markets lead to external effects (for non participating and 
therefore non-considered third parties)”.28 Consequently public interest arises – which is 
aimed at “protecting potentially disadvantaged parties” (owing to reasons attributed to market 
structure and information asymmetry).29
The justification for capital adequacy regulation within the banking sector, on the basis of 
market failures, is considered to be unconvincing. According to Dowd, three principal and 
traditional arguments which he considers to be insufficiently justified include:30
- The argument that capital adequacy is required for prudential related reasons. He 
attributes the weakness in this argument to the fact that most of its proponents do not 
expand on the prudential need in the first place.
- The second argument relates to that which was put forward by Benston and Kaufman31
which attributes the need for capital adequacy on the basis of its potential to address 
regulator- induced moral hazard problems. In Dowd’s opinion, the weakness inherent 
in this argument stems from the fact that such an argument does not provide enough 
justification for a preference for capital regulation over that of laissez faire.
- The third argument which is considered by Dowd to be more popular in Europe, is 
namely, that capital adequacy regulation is required for the protection of small 
depositors. His criticism of such an argument relates to the lack of clarity and 
justification which exists in accounting for why such depositors should be accorded 
protection at the expense of taxpayers.
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The most important of all arguments, in Dowd’s opinion, relates to that which was put 
forward by Miles32, who suggested that an information asymmetry between bank managers 
and depositors had the potential to generate market failures which consequently provides the 
rationale for government or central bank intervention in the financial system.33 Such an 
argument, still, does not evade criticism which draws from Dowd’s opinion that it is not 
founded on the basis of market failure and that, rather, it is based on the government’s failure 
(moral hazard created by regulatory authorities themselves).34
In relation to his criticism that failures related to information asymmetry are founded on 
governments’ failures and in relation to the inherent potential of information asymmetry to 
generate genuine market failures, although moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance 
schemes is a consequence of regulators’ failure to price premiums appropriately, genuine 
market failures attributed to the chain reaction generated between systemic risks, liquidity 
risks and asymmetric information justify the need for capital adequacy regulation within the 
banking sector. However, recent crisis has highlighted the fact that capital adequacy 
requirements on their own, do not suffice to counter problems attributed to systemic risks and 
liquidity risks. Furthermore, the reason for the restriction of regulation to the banking sector 
alone is not justified. 
Disclosure requirements are not only considered best in addressing information asymmetry (a 
market failure which is very peculiar, but not restricted to securities markets), but also have 
the potential to exacerbate or prevent (through relevant disclosures about loan loss 
provisioning) systemic bank runs. 
5. Disclosure Requirements
Recent amendments to Pillar 3 of Basel II, which include a statement that “banks need to 
make disclosures that reflect their real risk profile as markets evolve over time”, are aimed at 
strengthening guiding principles of Pillar 3 (as provided for under paragraph 809).35 As well 
as reflecting their real risk profiles, banks’ responsibilities towards market participants are 
also emphasised by the Basel Committee.
Paragraph 809 of the Basel II framework not only highlights the objective of Pillar 3, namely, 
the supplementation of the minimum capital requirements under Pillar 1, as well as 
supplementing Pillar 2, but also draws attention to the Committee’s endeavours to promulgate 
market discipline through the development of a set of disclosure requirements which will 
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enable market participants to evaluate fundamental sets of information on the scope of 
application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes – hence the capital adequacy of 
the institution.36 In the Committee’s opinion, such disclosures are considered particularly 
relevant within the framework where “reliance on internal methodologies gives banks greater 
discretion in assessing capital requirements.”37 The additional text to paragraph 809 of the 
Basel II framework, reads as follows: 
“The Committee emphasises, that beyond disclosure requirements, as set forth in Part 4 
Section II of the framework, banks are responsible for conveying their actual risk profile to 
market participants. Furthermore, information disclosed by banks should be adequate to meet 
this objective.”38
Other measures aimed at enhancing disclosure requirements relate to areas which include 
“securitisation exposures in the trading book and sponsorship of off balance sheet vehicles.”39
According to the Summary of the Impact Assessment Document, such amendments are not 
only aimed at improving investors’ understanding of risk profiles of banks, but also aimed at 
reinforcing bank risk management incentives – by allowing market participants to exercise 
discipline.40
6. Impact of Remuneration Policies on Risk Taking Incentives
In acknowledging the impact of remuneration policies on risk taking incentives in the 
financial sector, paragraph 5 of the introductory section to the Recommendation on 
Remuneration Policies,41 highlights the fact that “creating appropriate incentives within the 
remuneration system itself should reduce the burden on risk management and increase the 
likelihood that such systems become effective.” Relevant information on remuneration 
policies and any updates where a change in policy occurs constitute vital elements which 
should be disclosed – as provided for under section 3 paragraph 7 of the Recommendation. 
Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the third section highlights the importance of disclosing such 
information (which may assume the form of an independent remuneration policy statement, a 
periodic disclosure in annual financial statements), in a “clear and easily understandable way” 
to applicable stakeholders.42
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Paragraph 2 of the Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Sector43 acknowledges that whilst “inappropriate remuneration practices” in the financial 
services industry was not the principal cause of the recent financial crisis, that it is widely 
agreed that it fuelled excessive levels of risk taking – hence contributing to huge losses for 
major financial undertakings. Furthermore, the failure of financial undertakings and systemic 
problems which arose throughout the EU and worldwide, are attributed to “excessive risk 
taking” in the financial services industry.44
According to the Summary of the Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive,45
proposed amendments to the CRD will ultimately result in “more effective risk management 
incentives and practices, more adequate and less volatile bank capital requirements and 
enhanced disclosure of bank risk positions to market participants.”46
7. Regulatory Competition, Binding and Non Binding Legislation
The impact of binding and mandatory capital and disclosure requirements will be considered 
from the context of regulatory competition and Basel regulations.
A. Importance of Binding Legislation
In considering the role of the regulatory capital regime, it is argued47 that even if capital 
requirements are not binding, they do affect the transmission process of monetary policy 
(transmission process of exogenous shocks to bank interest rates, prices, and economic 
activity). The “sizeable real effects” of binding capital requirements, regardless of the 
regulatory regime, has constituted the focus of discussion – such sizeable real effects being 
demonstrated through the possible lending restrictions (via interest rate hikes), which banks 
may be compelled to implement  as a means of complying with such requirements. 48  The 
different effects generated by different types of bank capital regulations in the transmission 
process of exogenous shocks to bank interest rates, prices, and economic activities has also 
been illustrated.49 Furthermore it was demonstrated that, even if capital requirements are not 
binding, a “bank capital channel” may operate through a signalling effect of capital buffers on 
deposit rates”.50
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Proposals put forward by Kashyap et al51, which are aimed at complementing the existing 
regulatory framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms, comprise of 
the establishment of a private insurance scheme funded by investors whereby banks subject to 
capital regulation would be given the option to purchase this insurance. A decision to opt for 
such an insurance scheme; in their opinion, should be rewarded by lowering a bank’s capital 
ratio.52
In terms of increasing flexibility (with meta regulation being accorded greatest flexibility), 
enforced self regulation53 lies between mandatory regulation and meta regulation (an example 
being provided by Basel II). Banks subject to capital rules, but which still have the option of 
choosing certain schemes could be classified under enforced self regulation or meta regulation 
depending on whether such rules are imposed by the State or by such standard setters such as 
the Basel Committee. Whether (or not) management’s incentives could best be impacted 
through binding legislation, enforced self regulation or meta regulation, depends on the 
degree of fettered and unfettered discretion which should be accorded to firms – which should 
be determined based on individual firm circumstances. In relation to the previous paragraph, 
rewarding banks which have decided to opt for an insurance scheme (through a reduction of 
the bank’s capital ratio), serves as a commendable way of stimulating such banks’ incentives, 
facilitating market based regulation – whilst attempting to deal with liquidity and funding 
problems. The governing regulation (whether enforced self regulation or meta regulation) 
would depend on whether the banks are subjected to capital rules imposed by their 
jurisdictions or to those of standard setters such as the Basel Committee. Where such banks 
are governed by rules prescribed by their national authorities and given the presumption that 
enforcement mechanisms operating in such jurisdictions are reasonably effective, then such a 
decision to provide such banks with the option to purchase capital insurance or liquidity 
insurance mechanisms would certainly appear to be the right way forward.
However where such banks are subject to capital regulation under (Basel II) the Basel 
Committee, whose enforcement mechanisms are considered to be weak, then a decision to 
grant further options to such banks should require that such schemes not only be monitored at  
greater level than presently operates, but also enforced with greater degree than is presently 
the case. Where options are granted to banks which are subject to Basel II regulations, clear 
rules (as prescribed by the Basel Committee or other standard setters – where Basel II rules do 
not operate) defining the boundaries of such schemes should exist. 
In relation to proposals which involve options to purchase capital insurance or liquidity 
insurance mechanisms, a decision to reward such banks (who opt for such schemes) with
lower levels of capital should be considered on the basis of certain criteria which include 
inherent institutional risks attributed to such institutions – including risks which could arise 
from operational risks and poor management of internal controls. One of the objectives which 
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the Basel II framework was intended to achieve is the “alignment of capital adequacy 
assessment more closely with the key elements of banking risks and to provide incentives for 
banks to enhance their risk management and management capabilities.”54 The Basel 
Committee is of the opinion that “improved risk sensitivity in minimum capital requirements” 
with respect to greater recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques, has the potential to 
provide positive incentives to banks to improve risk measurement and management of risk 
mitigants.55
Furthermore, it recognises the fact that “whilst new proposals provide capital reduction for 
various forms of transactions that reduce risk, they impose minimum operational standards in 
recognition that poor management of operational risks (including legal risks) could render 
such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that although partial mitigation is 
rewarded, banks will be required to hold capital against residual risks.”56
Rewards accorded to banks, that is the lowering of such banks’ capital ratios, may not 
necessarily facilitate a realisation of some of Basel II’s objectives – namely the achievement 
of “prudentially sound, incentive-compatible and risk sensitive capital requirements” – for 
which the Basel Committee made provision for an evolutionary, progressive approach to 
calculating Pillar One capital charges.57 As illustrated, the fact that certain banks have 
implemented or operate with risk mitigants does not necessarily serve as a reliable indicator 
or calculative basis that risks within such institutions are being managed and controlled 
effectively – neither does it justify a reduction in the level of capital levels to be retained by 
such banks. Furthermore, such options have the potential to facilitate practices associated with 
regulatory arbitrage since the alignment of regulatory and economic capital is considered to 
essential in mitigating such practices.58
In what way could disclosure requirements contribute in helping to reduce risks of granting 
reduced capital level rewards to institutions who may have poor management systems?
Banks opting for insurance schemes should be subject to mandatory disclosure requirements 
which should reveal information helpful in determining whether or not they are eligible for 
such schemes and for reduced capital levels. Reasons for opting for such schemes – backed up 
by banks' current financial statements, as well as detailed information relating to the 
management information systems, internal controls and other risk management processes 
which operate within such banks should be disclosed in order to assist in the identification of 
potential sources of risks. Risk management processes of banks and banking groups should 
not only be proven to be complying with supervisory requirements of a “comprehensive 
management process”, and that such processes “identify, evaluate, monitor and control, or 
mitigate all material risks and assesses their overall capital adequacy in relation to the risk 
profile” of banks and banking groups, but that such risk management processes correspond to 
the size and complexity of the institutions.59 With respect to internal controls and audits, 
supervisors should not only ensure that bank internal controls operate within the banks and 
                                               
54 See Consultative Document: Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord at page 1 < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca02.pdf>
55 ibid at page 3
56 ibid
57 Such evolutionary approach, according to the Basel Committee, “allows banks that meet 
incremental minimum capital requirements to avail themselves of more risk-sensitive methodologies” in 
calculating regulatory capital”; ibid at page 7
58 See F Heid, „Cyclical Implications of Minimum Capital Requirements“ Deutsche Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies No 06/2005 at page 2
59 Core Principle 7, Basel Core Principles for Effective System of Banking Supervision
that these are adequate for the size and complexity of their business, but should also include 
clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility, delineate between certain 
functions,60but ensure that reconciliation of processes exist, as well as confirm that banks’ 
assets are safeguarded with appropriate independent internal audit and compliance 
functions.61
Section 3.4 of the Summary of the Impact Assessment Document62 highlights the need for a 
“legally binding EU instrument” which would reinforce the role of supervisors and empower 
them in their assessment of remuneration schemes of certain regulated financial institutions 
within a broader context of sound risk management. Such an argument, “within the context of 
prudential supervision”, has been advanced, not only because of “the importance of achieving 
relevant objectives more effectively”, but also given the fact that recommendations are not 
legally enforceable instruments.63 Furthermore, the need to discourage practices related to 
regulatory arbitrage, practices which could occur in the event that companies decide to 
relocate to jurisdictions where a recommendation64 does not apply, and in the absence of a 
binding EU legislation, constitutes another reason for introducing a legally binding 
instrument.65
B. The Theory of Regulatory Competition
Whilst some apparent advantages are associated with binding and mandatory regulations, the 
disadvantage inherent in mandatory regulation – when compared with the form of regulation 
synonymous with regulatory competition, is namely, the fact that mandatory regulation does 
not provide the choice of legal regimes which is offered to market participants under the 
theory of regulatory competition. It is contended that mandatory regulation, by compelling 
market participants to comply with a legal regime, generates “sub-optimal” benefits whilst the 
availability of choice accorded by the theory of regulatory competition, provides the potential 
to generate optimal regulation.66
                                               
60 Functions which involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its 
assets and 
liabilities; See Core Principle 17, Basel Core Principles for Effective System of Banking Supervision
61 ibid
62 See Summary of Impact Assessment document amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading 
book, securitization issues and remuneration policies at page 4 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf
63 ibid
64 In this case , the Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies
65 See Summary of Impact Assessment document amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading 
book, securitization issues and remuneration policies at page 4
66 „A possible problem with a mandatory disclosure regime is that all issuers must reveal the same 
information about themselves, without consideration of their individual characteristics or the needs of their target 
investors. Given that preparing a disclosure statement is costly, particularly for an initial public offering, these 
mandatory disclosure rules may price out some issuers from making offerings that are desirable to the market.“ 
See EJ Pan,  "Harmonization of U.S.-EU securities regulation: The case for a single European securities 
regulator". Law and Policy in International Business at page 3 FindArticles.com.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3791/is_200301/ai_n9192864/
Other benefits attributed to the theory of regulatory competition include:67
- By modifying their regulations to optimally match the interests of those that bear the 
cost and incur the benefit of regulation, regulators would be able to facilitate more 
superior regulation
- Regulatory competition permits the creation of a single market without requiring 
member states to forfeit their regulatory power.
C. Criticisms of the Theory of Regulatory Competition
The main criticism which the theory has generated relates to the fact that “unfettered 
regulatory competition” would result in a “race to the bottom” whereby regulators, in 
competing for their interests, minimise rules to such an extent that the resulting outcome and 
benefits generated by such rules are minimal than required.68 Furthermore, it is argued that 
“regulatory co-opetition” is preferable to regulatory competition, not only because it offers a 
model through which optimal governance could be achieved (in a world where some degree 
of market failure will certainly almost exist), but also given the fact that “optimal governance 
requires a flexible mix of competition and co operation between governmental actors, as well 
as between governmental and non governmental actors.”69
Many similarities exist between Basel II and the form of regulation which is synonymous 
with the theory of regulatory competition. Basel II could also be considered to “optimally 
match the interests of those that bear the cost and incur the benefit of regulation”70– given its 
flexibility, its advanced and highly collaborative approach in generating rules. Basel II also 
allows for a choice of legal regimes- even though banks are still subjected to some degree of 
mandatory legislation. 
Proposed amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), as stipulated in the 
Summary of the Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive, are intended to 
“impose a binding obligation on credit institutions and investment firms to have remuneration 
policies which are consistent with effective risk management.”71 The expected result of 
making relevant principles (which are to be set out in the CRD) binding, will be the 
                                               
67 ibid ;The existence of three elements, on which regulatory competition is dependent are as follows: 
diversity of legal regimes, entity mobility, and governmental responsiveness; see ibid at page 3
68 ibid at page 4
69 See D C Esty and D Geradin, “Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative 
Perspectives” Oxford University Press 2001 at page 31; Furthermore, Esty and Geradin argue that whilst 
proponents of regulatory competition may contend that co-opetition leads to increased regulatory “capture” by 
interest groups – hence reduced governmental transparency and accountability, that “pitting environmental 
NGOs, industry associations, and other interests against each other, works out to flesh out viable policies, induce 
investment in the creation of policy analysis and other valuable information”- factors which, in their opinion, 
provide a watch dog mechanism and consequently serve as a check on regulatory capture; see ibid at page 45
70 EJ Pan,  "Harmonization of U.S.-EU securities regulation: The case for a single European securities 
regulator". Law and Policy in International Business at page 3
71 See pages 5 and 6 of the Summary of the Document amending the Capital Requirements 
Directive (section 5.4 “Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies”)
enhancement of compliance with such principles.72 It is also emphasised that a more effective 
implementation of the relevant principles of the Recommendation on remuneration policies 
would imply a “trade off which includes long – term benefits for the industry” which are 
attributed to improved risk management results, and of greater importance, broader benefits 
which relate to a “more stable and less pro cyclical financial system.”73
8. Conclusion
One vital reason why information disclosure should be encouraged lies in the fact that 
imperfect information is considered to be a cause of market failure which reduces the 
maximisation potential of regulatory competition.74  With regulatory competition, „efforts to 
outdo each other in reducing regulatory standards can trigger a downward spiral, also known 
as a “race to the bottom”, at the end of which only minimum regulatory standards, at best, can 
be enforced, making market events increasingly opaque and risky.“75 A consideration of the 
advantages and disadvantages of regulatory competition would appear to suggest that the 
regulatory co-optition model should be adopted. Even though such a model is considered by 
proponents of regulatory competition as having the potential to result in increased regulatory 
“capture” by interest groups – hence resulting in less governmental transparency and 
accountability, proponents of co-opetition argue that, amongst other benefits, it would result 
in the “fleshing out of viable policies and generate countervailing forces” which would not 
only serve as a watch dog mechanism, but also as a check on “capture”.76
Justification for greater enforcement with Basel II (than is presently the case), arises from the 
fact that whilst state imposed rules are obligatory, Basel II rules are persuasive by nature. 
Although Basel II and the regulatory competition theory facilitate market based regulation 
and harmonisation, once a member state has opted to be bound by certain rules, then such 
rules should be enforced in their entirety. The freedom to opt – through an initial decision, 
should not imply a freedom to decide at convenience. Even though a firm is still offered 
choices under Basel II, choices which are intended to best match their needs, such choices 
should still be made in accordance with guidelines prescribed by the standard setters 
(compliance) and enforced accordingly. In other words, such choices are still limited by 
boundaries stipulated by law.
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Perspectives” Oxford University Press 2001 at page 35
75 Deutsche Bundesbank , „Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche 
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